Introduction
Informality is the collection of firms, workers, and activities that operate outside the legal and regulatory frameworks.
1 It entails avoiding the burden of taxation and regulation but, at the same time, not fully enjoying the protection and services that the law and the state can provide. Informality is sometimes the result of agents "exiting" the formal sector as consequence of cost-benefit considerations; other times, it is the outcome of agents being "excluded" from formality as this becomes restrictive and the economy segmented.
In all cases, informality is a fundamental characteristic of underdevelopment and is best understood as a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon. It is determined both by the modes of socio-economic organization inherent to economies in the transition to modernity and by the relationship that the state establishes with private agents through regulation, monitoring, and the provision of public services. Informality is not only a reflection of underdevelopment, but may also be the source of further economic retardation. It implies misallocation of resources and entails losing the advantages of legality, such as police and judicial protection, access to formal credit institutions, and participation in international markets.
According to the estimates presented below, there is large heterogeneity in the extent of informality across countries in Latin America. In all of them, however, informality is much more widespread than in the USA, and some countries in the region are among the most informal economies in the world. The typical country in Latin America produces about 40% of GDP and employs 70% of the labor force informally.
These are astounding statistics, which indicate that informality is a substantive and pervasive phenomenon that must be explained and grappled with, particularly in the design of development policies.
This chapter studies informality in Latin America from a macroeconomic and international perspective. It uses the cross-country variation on informality measures and potentially related variables to study its causes and consequences. It then examines Latin American countries against this broad international context. The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents and discusses various measures of informality. Section II assesses the impact of informality on economic growth and poverty. Section III analyzes the main causes of informality. Section IV evaluates the empirical relevance of each determinant of informality to every Latin American country in the sample. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks.
I. Measuring Informality in Latin America and around the World
Although the definition of informality can be simple and precise, its measurement is not. Given that it is identified with working outside the legal and regulatory frameworks, informality is best described as a latent, unobserved variable. That is, a variable for which an accurate and complete measurement is not feasible but for which an approximation is possible through indicators reflecting its various aspects. Here we consider four such indicators, available for a relatively large collection of countries. Two of them refer to overall informal activity in the country, and the other two relate in particular to informal employment. Each indicator on its own has conceptual and statistical shortcomings as a proxy for informality; taken together, however, they may provide a robust approximation to the subject.
The indicators related to overall informal activity are the Schneider index of the shadow economy and the Heritage Foundation index of informal markets.
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The Schneider index combines the DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple-indicator-multiple-cause) method, the physical input (electricity) method, and the excess currency-demand approach for the estimation of the share of production that is not declared to tax and regulatory authorities. The Heritage Foundation index is based on subjective perceptions of general compliance with the law, with particular emphasis on the role played by official corruption.
The indicators that focus on the labor aspect of informality are the prevalence of self-employment and the lack of pension coverage. The former is given by the ratio of self to total employment, as reported by the International Labor Organization. The latter is given by the fraction of the labor force that does not contribute to a retirement pension scheme, as given in the World Bank's World Development Indicators. Appendix 3 presents some descriptive statistics on the four informality indicators. In particular, it
shows that, as expected, they are significantly positively correlated, with correlation coefficients ranging from 0.59 to 0.90 -high enough to represent the same phenomenon but not so high as to make them mutually redundant.
Using data on these four indicators, we can assess the prevalence of informality across Latin America. For comparison purposes, Figure 1 presents data on the four informality indicators for individual countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The USA and Chile are used as benchmark countries. The USA is the developed country to which the region is most closely related. Chile is the Latin American country often taken as a model for economic reforms and sustained growth in the region. 3 It is clear from the figure that there is considerable variation in informality across countries in Latin America. However, in all of them, the degree of informality is much higher than in the USA; and for some countries (e.g., Bolivia and Haiti) it is comparable to the most informal countries in the world. For the median country in Latin America, about 40% of GDP is produced informally. Informal employment is more difficult to ascertain.
Using the measure based on pension contributions, about 70% of the labor force is informal in the median country in Latin America.
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II. The Cost of Informality
Informality is a distorted, second-best response of an excessively regulated economy to the shocks it faces and its potential for growth. It is a distorted response 3 The LAC countries under consideration are those included in any of the four regressions where informality is a dependent variable (Table 3) . They are 20 countries plus Chile, which functions as a comparator country, unless otherwise noted. Trinidad and Tobago is also excluded since the World Bank classification (as of July 2007) considers the country as a high-income country. See Appendix 1 for sample of countries in each regression. 4 Self-employment is arguably a lower bound for the measure of informal labor given that tax and regulation evasion occurs massively in all types of firms.
because it implies misallocation of resources and entails losing, at least partially, the advantages of legality, such as police and judicial protection, access to formal credit institutions, and participation in international markets. Trying to escape the control of the state induces many informal firms to remain sub-optimally small, use irregular procurement and distribution channels, and constantly divert resources to mask their activities or bribe officials. Conversely, formal firms are induced to use more intensively the resources that are less burdened by the regulatory regime; in particular for developing countries, this means that formal firms are less labor intensive than they should be according to the countries' endowments. In addition, the informal sector generates a negative externality that compounds its adverse effect on efficiency: informal activities use and congest public infrastructure without contributing the tax revenue to replenish it.
Since public infrastructure complements private capital in the process of production, a larger informal sector implies slower productivity growth.
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Compared with a first-best response, the expansion of the informal sector often represents distorted and deficient economic growth.
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This statement merits further clarification: informality is sub-optimal with respect to the first-best scenario that occurs in an economy without excessive regulations and with adequate provision of public services. Nevertheless, informality is indeed preferable to a fully formal but sclerotic economy that is unable to circumvent its regulation-induced rigidities. This brings to bear an important policy implication: the mechanism of formalization matters enormously for its consequences on employment, efficiency, and growth. If formalization is purely based on enforcement, it will likely lead to unemployment and low growth. If, on the other hand, it is based on improvements in both the regulatory framework and the quality/availability of public services, it will bring about more efficient use of resources and higher growth.
5 See Loayza (1996) for an endogenous-growth model highlighting the negative effect of informality through the congestion of public services. 6 This does not necessarily mean that informal firms are not dynamic or lagging behind their formal counterparts. In fact, in equilibrium the risk-adjusted returns in both sectors should be equalized at the margin. See Maloney (2004) for evidence on the dynamism of Latin American informal firms. The arguments presented in the text apply to the comparison between an excessively regulated economy and one that is not.
From an empirical perspective, the ambiguous impact of formalization highlights an important difficulty in assessing the impact of informality on economic growth: two countries can have the same level of informality, but if it has been achieved in different ways, the countries' growth rates may also be markedly different. Countries where informality is kept at bay by drastic enforcement will fare worse than countries where informality is low because of light regulations and appropriate public services.
We now present a simple regression analysis of the effect of informality on growth. As suggested above, this analysis must control for enforcement; and a straightforward, albeit debatable, way to do so is by including a proxy for the overall capacity of the state as a control variable in the regression. For this purpose, we try two proxies: the level of GDP per capita, and the ratio of government expenditures to GDP.
The former has the advantage of also accounting for conditional convergence, and the latter has the advantage of more closely reflecting the size of the state.
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Another important consideration for this empirical analysis is that informality may not only affect but also be affected by economic growth. For example, faster growth could raise the profitability of production and the real wage, relative to the perceived costs of formality, thus encouraging more firms and workers to shift out of the informal sector. In order to ascertain the impact of informality on growth, we need to isolate the exogenous variation in informality. We do this through an instrumental-variable approach, where the instruments are selected among the variables that are postulated as determinants of informality -indicators of law and order, business regulatory freedom, secondary schooling, and socio-demographic factors. Since some of them have a relationship with economic growth that is independent of informality, we only use as instruments the sets of variables that comply with the exclusion restrictions, as diagnosed by the Hansen test of orthogonality between the instruments and the regression residuals (see notes on Table   1a and 1b). We choose a period of about 20 years for the measure of average growth in order to achieve a compromise between merely cyclical, 7 We also considered as proxy the ratio of tax revenues to GDP. Even though the number of observations drops considerably, the results were similar regarding the negative effect of informality on growth.
short-run growth (which would be unaffected by informality) and very long-run growth (which could be confused with the sources, rather than consequences, of informality).
We consider two alternative control variables: Initial GDP per capita (Table 1a) or initial ratio of government expenditures to GDP (Table 1b) They clearly indicate that an increase in informality leads to a decrease in economic growth. All four informality indicators carry negative and highly significant regression coefficients. The harmful effect of informality on growth is not only robust and significant, but its magnitude makes it also economically meaningful: Using the estimates from the IV regressions controlling for initial government expenditures/GDP, an increase of one standard deviation in any of the informality indicators leads to a decline of 0.7 -1 percentage points in the rate of per capita GDP growth. 8 These are conservative estimates when compared to those from the regression that controls for GDP per capita -there, the growth effects of a reduction in informality are about twice as large.
There is also a close connection between poverty and informality, reflecting at least in part the negative relationship between economic growth and informality. Table 2 presents cross-country regression analysis with the headcount poverty index as dependent variable and, in turn, the four measures of informality as explanatory variables. In order to have a close chronological match between dependent and explanatory variables, the headcount poverty index corresponds to the latest available measure per country. As in the growth regressions, the level of GDP per capita (Table 2a) or the ratio of government expenditures to GDP (Table 2b ) are included as control variables. Also as in previous regressions, we present both OLS and IV estimates, the latter to account for the likely endogeneity of informality with respect to poverty.
The regression results reveal a positive relationship between the prevalence of informality and the incidence of poverty. When government expenditure is controlled for, the four measures of informality carry positive and significant coefficients in the IV regressions. Similarly, when the level of GDP per capita is controlled for, three of the four informality indicators carry positive and significant coefficients (self-employment is the exception).
The significant relationship between informality, on the one hand, and economic growth and poverty, on the other, is remarkable: it underscores the importance of the issue and urges for the analysis on the complex sources of informality. To this, we turn next.
III. The Causes of Informality
Informality is a fundamental characteristic of underdevelopment, shaped both by the modes of socio-economic organization inherent to economies in the transition to modernity and by the relationship that the state establishes with private agents through regulation, monitoring, and the provision of public services. As such, informality is best understood as a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon.
Informality arises when the costs of belonging to the country's legal and regulatory framework exceed its benefits. Formality entails costs of entry --in the form of lengthy, expensive, and complicated registration procedures--and costs of permanence --including payment of taxes, compliance with mandated labor benefits and remunerations, and observance of environmental, health, and other regulations. The benefits of formality potentially consist of police protection against crime and abuse, recourse to the judicial system for conflict resolution and contract enforcement, access to legal financial institutions for credit provision and risk diversification, and, more generally, the possibility of expanding markets both domestically and internationally. At least in principle, formality also voids the need to pay bribes and prevents penalties and fees, to which informal firms are continuously subject to. Therefore, informality is more prevalent when the regulatory framework is burdensome, the quality of government services to formal firms is low, and the state's monitoring and enforcement power is weak.
These cost and benefit considerations are affected by the structural characteristics of underdevelopment, dealing in particular with educational achievement, production structure, and demographic trends. Other things equal, a higher level of education reduces informality by increasing labor productivity and, therefore, making labor regulations less onerous and formal returns potentially larger. Likewise, a production structure tilted towards primary sectors like agriculture, rather than to the more complex we can construct for them a predicted value based on the regression analysis using the sample of all other countries.)
The regression results are presented in Table 3 . They are remarkably robust across informality measures. Moreover, all regression coefficients have the expected sign and are highly significant. Informality decreases when law and order, business regulatory freedom, or schooling achievement rise. Similarly, informality decreases when the production structure shifts away from agriculture and demographic pressures from youth and rural populations decline. The fact that each explanatory variable retains its sign and significance after controlling for the rest indicates that no single determinant is sufficient to explain informality. All of them should be taken into account for a complete understanding of informality.
The four explanatory variables account jointly for a large share of the cross- 
IV. Explaining Informality in Latin American Countries
The cross-country regression analysis presented above can be used to assess the determinants of informality that are most relevant to each Latin American country. The first issue to explore is whether these countries are outliers or follow the general trend established by the cross-country regressions. of each explanatory variable is obtained by multiplying the corresponding regression coefficient (from Table 3 ) times the difference in the value of this explanatory variable between each Latin American and Caribbean country and the comparator country.
The importance of a particular explanatory variable would, therefore, depend on the size of its effect on informality in the cross-section of countries and how far apart the two countries are with respect to the explanatory variable in question. Naturally, the sum of the contributions equals the total difference in predicted informality between each individual country and Chile. This difference is plotted in Figure 4 . As expected, it
shows that all the countries have larger (predicted) informality levels than Chile. Haiti, Honduras and Guatemala are predicted to be the most informal (and in general show the largest difference with respect to Chile). On the other hand, Uruguay, Argentina and Costa Rica are predicted to be the least informal among the Latin American and
Caribbean countries, though they still show larger informality levels than Chile. 
V. Conclusion
By any measure, informality is quite prevalent in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. This is worrisome because it denotes misallocation of resources (labor in particular) and inefficient utilization of government services, which can jeopardize the countries' growth and poverty-alleviation prospects. The evidence presented in this chapter shows that informality has a statistically and economically significant negative impact on growth -and an equally significant positive impact on the incidence of poverty across countries.
Informality arises when the costs of belonging to the economy's legal and regulatory framework exceeds the benefits. Thus informality is more prevalent where the regulatory framework is burdensome, the quality of government services is low, and the state's monitoring and enforcement capacity is weak. But these cost-benefit calculations are also affected by key structural characteristics of the economy -such as its productive and demographic structure and the availability of skilled labor. This chapter has argued that it is important to take into account all these factors when trying to ascertain the causes of informality.
In the case of Latin America, this chapter has shown that informality is primarily the outcome of a combination of poor public services and a burdensome regulatory framework. Low levels of education, as measured by secondary schooling, are less important in this respect. In lower income countries, informality (particularly regarding labor markets) is exacerbated when the production structure is heavily based on agriculture and other rural activities and when the labor participation of young people, resulting from recent demographic transition, is large.
Informality is a complex phenomenon that is best understood from several angles:
considering different indicators that reflect its various aspects and treating it as both cause and consequence of underdevelopment. This chapter is a modest contribution in this direction. 
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